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response from Churchland and Ramachandran (1993). They dis-
agree with Dennett because they think that the brain is not merely
“finding out” in the perceptual completion of the blind spot and
artificial scotomata. They also disagree with Dennett’s claim that
there are no neural responses devoted to the blind spot, citing Fio-
rani et al. (1992) as showing the contrary. As far as we can see,
however, Churchland and Ramachandran do not think that the
brain fills in in the sense of providing a roughly continuous spatial
representation. In fact, on the basis of Ramachandran’s other writ-
ings (1992a; 1992b; 1993a; Ramachandran & Gregory 1991), it
seems to us that they might be prepared to accept some variant of
the second story we attribute to Dennett – the one in which the
brain attaches a label. In any case, we think the debate would be
better conducted in relation to issues about isomorphism and link-
ing propositions. We go on to discuss this in section 5.2.
11. Note that these frequencies are much lower than the fre-
quencies usually revealed in flicker studies, which have cut-off fre-
quencies of more than 30 Hz and peak around 4 to 6 Hz.
12. Given that the experimental animals (cats) were anes-
thetized, the same caveats discussed in section 4.5 apply here
when interpreting the relationship between neural and perceptual
events.
13. These results are consistent with the work of Cornsweet
and Teller (1965), which showed that increment thresholds are
unaffected by changes in the appearance of backgrounds when the
physical characteristics of those backgrounds are held constant.
14. We cannot review here all the details of the experiments
performed by Eskew (1989), but we would like to note that sev-
eral of his findings suggested that a complete account in terms of
adaptation and eye movements is not likely: “Although eye move-
ments and adaptation might play a role in the chromatic diffusion
phenomenon, an additional mechanism which is sensitive to the
effect of the contour would be required to account for the gap ef-
fect” (Eskew 1989, p. 726).
15. Nevertheless, Todorović goes on to say that, “given the lack
of relevant data, the single-cell type of bridge locus is a heuristi-
cally useful assumption.” We disagree, for the reasons stated in
section 4.5.
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Abstract: The suggestion that analytic isomorphism should be rejected
applies especially to the domain of speech perception because (1) the
guiding assumption that solving the lack of invariance problem is the key
to explaining speech perception is a form of analytic isomorphism, and (2)
after nearly half a century of research there is virtually no empirical evi-
dence of isomorphism between perceptual experience and lower-level
processing units.
A problem with some work in cognitive science is that the empir-
ical data are too highly leveraged theoretically. Pessoa, Thompson
and Noë’s target article provides terrific relief from such work, for
its significance lies precisely in its deflationary theoretical inter-
pretation of the empirical findings it cites. There is empirical evi-
dence for neural filling-in, but its importance is doubly qualified.
For one thing, neural filling-in cannot be promoted to a method-
ological principle. Empirical isomorphism does not imply analytic
isomorphism. Moreover, even in cases where there is neural fill-
ing-in or isomorphism between neural activity and perceptual ex-
perience more generally, it becomes less significant once we see
that perception is not ( just) a matter of what the brain is doing,
but of what the animal is doing as well. Put differently, if we do
not care (as much) about representations, a fortiori, we do not care
about whether they are isomorphic to the subject’s experience.
Still, the central methodological moral of “finding out about fill-
ing in” is not, I think, that we should downgrade the status of fill-
ing-in as a theoretical category, but that we should reject analytic
isomorphism. For as Pessoa et al. point out, analytic isomorphism
states a criterion of adequacy not just for explanations of vision,
but for cognitive neuroscientific explanations more generally. By
way of reinforcing this claim, I would like to suggest that their crit-
icism of analytic isomorphism is especially applicable to the do-
main of speech perception. Indeed, I will suggest that rejecting
analytic isomorphism provides the key to progress in explaining
speech perception.1
The particular form that analytic isomorphism takes in speech
perception research is the assumption that the goal of a theory of
speech perception is to solve “the lack of invariance problem.”
With a few recent and notable exceptions,2 solving the lack of in-
variance problem has been taken to be a criterion of adequacy for
explanations of speech perception for nearly fifty years. “Lack of
invariance” refers to the widely recognized fact that there is no
one-to-one correspondence between units of acoustic structure
and perceived phonemes. A single consonant sound, for example,
may be realized acoustically in a variety of ways depending on the
surrounding phonetic context. This lack of invariance only be-
comes a problem, however, if one assumes that there must be an
isomorphic mapping between the subject’s perceptual experience
and underlying physical structure. And this is just what has been
assumed.
Thus, identifying an initial stage of processing in which pro-
cessing units are structurally isomorphic (e.g., segmented, linearly
concatenated) to perceived phonemes is taken to be a criterion of
adequacy for an explanation of speech perception. Although these
processing units are not always explicitly identified in neural terms
(sometimes they are identified in acoustic or articulatory terms),
it is the doctrine of analytic isomorphism that underwrites the goal
of solving the lack of invariance problem, for the latter assumes
that there must be isomorphism between the subject’s perceptual
experience and lower-level processing units (called “invariants”).
As it is put in one well-known article, “invariant gestures3 of
some description there must be, for they are required, not merely
for our particular theory of speech perception, but for any ade-
quate theory [emphasis in original]” (Liberman & Mattingley
1985, p. 3). The difficulty is that speech perception research
guided by the framework of analytic isomorphism, has made little
progress. Put bluntly, by the standards embodied in analytic iso-
morphism, there are no adequate theories of speech perception.
Despite nearly half a century of searching, virtually no empirical
invariants have been found. Only one theory has identified even a
candidate for an invariant property, but it has done so for only one
class of consonants, and it is present only about 85% of the time
(Stevens & Blumstein 1981). Thus, is seems that analytic isomor-
phism, as embodied in the goal of solving the lack of invariance
problem, will have to be rejected before progress in explaining
speech perception will be made.
Pessoa et al. caution against inferring analytic isomorphism
from the evidence of particular cases of empirical isomorphism
(e.g., cases of neural filling in). But in the domain of speech per-
ception, analytic isomorphism survives despite the virtual absence
of empirical confirmation. This suggests that in speech percep-
tion, at least, analytic isomorphism functions not merely as a
methodological principle, but as dogma. If so, it is likely to prove
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more difficult to eradicate. A personal-level, activity-based ap-
proach, however, such as the one favored by Pessoa et al. for vi-
sion, may well be the place for speech perception research to start.
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NOTES
1. In Appelbaum (1995) I treat this claim much more extensively, al-
though I do not use the term “analytic isomorphism.”
2. These include Browman and Goldstein (1996), McClelland and El-
man (1986), and Nusbaum and Henley (in press).
3. Gestures are here taken to be forms of neural representations.
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